In Brief
As a US treaty ally yet a close partner of China, Thailand has initially remained silent and aloof on AUKUS. The Thai government has not explicitly spoken for or against AUKUS. At first glance, Thailand appears to be neutral or hedging with all powers. I argue differently that for Thailand, AUKUS, as well as the Australia-US alliance, seems to be an “unpinnable” alliance in the sense that it cannot be firmly pinned down in Thailand’s strategic mindset. This indecision is perhaps due to domestic politics. For the last decade or so, Thai foreign policy has been generally driven by what I term “hedging by default.” The term encapsulates how different Thai governmental agencies and actors pursued different policies without having a whole-of-government strategic approach.
The Australia-United States alliance—as enunciated in the ANZUS Treaty in 1951—is now opined as “unbreakable,” which is part and parcel of the latest trilateral arrangement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, known as AUKUS. First and foremost, it is a normative alliance, upholding a shared vision of a liberal rules-based world order in the Indo-Pacific. Secondly, it signifies that Washington and Canberra are prepared to act in unison to maintain regional peace and order.
Conventional wisdom in Southeast Asia holds that AUKUS, primarily aimed at providing Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, has raised regional uneasiness regarding a potential arms race and nuclear proliferation. However, the perception of the tripartite alliance varies across Indo-Pacific nations, with an even greater fracturing of opinion on the Australia-US alliance. China skeptically sees this new military alliance as the latest containment strategy against Beijing. Within ASEAN, Indonesia and Malaysia hold that the trilateral pact risks undermining regional stability and peace. Conversely, Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines welcome, to various degrees, the AUKUS powers in the region, especially the United States.
On the contrary, as a US treaty ally yet a close partner of China, Thailand has initially remained silent and aloof on AUKUS. The Thai government has not explicitly spoken for or against AUKUS. At first glance, Thailand appears to be neutral or hedging with all powers. I argue differently that for Thailand, AUKUS, as well as the Australia-US alliance, seems to be an “unpinnable” alliance in the sense that it cannot be firmly pinned down in Thailand’s strategic mindset.
Despite this “unpinnability,” Thailand does not have a negative perspective toward the Australia-US alliance. During the Cold War, Thailand endorsed this strategic alliance to curb the spread of communism. By doing so, the alliance served as the keystone for Thailand’s national security. In the era of 21 st -century geopolitical competition, Thailand has a different threat perception. In contrast to the Australia-US alliance, Thailand does not perceive China as a geostrategic rival.
But the question remains: why has Thailand yet to define an official position on the Australia-US alliance? This indecision is perhaps due to domestic politics. For the last decade or so, Thai foreign policy has been generally driven by what I term “hedging by default.” The term encapsulates how different Thai governmental agencies and actors pursued different policies without having a whole-of-government strategic approach. Overall, it looks like hedging, but there is, in fact, no strategy. For example, against strong public criticism, the Royal Thai Navy has cited AUKUS and the growing strategic uncertainty to rationalize a bid to procure submarines from China.
Then, there is the China factor to consider. Thailand perceives China as a comprehensive strategic partner, especially in economic terms. The formation of AUKUS sharpens the image of Canberra as America’s “deputy sheriff,” while the so-called Sino-US/Australian “trade wars” during the COVID-19 pandemic render Thailand suspicious of the benefits of military realignment against China.
Lastly, despite its constructive intentions to maintain peace and stability, AUKUS has an optics problem. Misinformation about the alliance is regularly circulated across the region, in the media, and even in the policy-making community. The first myth asserts that the alliance risks increasing the geopoliticization and securitization of the region, particularly the security dilemma in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. In the second myth, AUKUS is portrayed as a nuclear submarine dealer to Australia and the catalyst for a new arms race or even the destabilization of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) or Bangkok Treaty, which was signed in 1995.
The Australia-US alliance needs to escape these myths to secure more positive optics. These recurring false narratives contribute to Thailand’s ambivalence, if not outright skepticism, toward AUKUS. The alliance can debunk the myth that AUKUS is jeopardizing nuclear proliferation and sparking an arms race by reemphasizing the significance of the nuclear-free zone articulated in the SEANWFZ Treaty. Thereby repositioning themselves as promoters of non-proliferation norms in the region.
In order to recapture traction in Thai foreign policy, the alliance must reaffirm its commitment to ASEAN centrality. The United States is shifting its geostrategic efforts towards minilateral groupings, such as the Quad, AUKUS, and trilateral arrangements. By default, the nascent rise of minilateralism threatens to overshadow or even bypass the ASEAN-centered regional architecture, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), etc.
Washington and Canberra should strive for a more inclusive, rather than exclusive, alliance. It should function less like a members-only club and more like an inclusive community that facilitates enduring peaceful conditions in the region. An excellent example of inclusivity in the alliance is its member’s unwavering support of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), pivotal to bolstering ASEAN centrality. Another opportunity to paint the alliance in a more inclusive light is the development of a new Cobra Gold Plus model that can act as an alternative joint military exercise option. It would include all major regional stakeholders and focus on interoperability, intelligence sharing, and technological transfers.
The Australia-US pact should not pressure Bangkok to choose a side in the Sino-American geopolitical rivalry. Given the diversity of interests within ASEAN, Thailand and other ASEAN members do not share the China threat discourse. Rather than adopting a nihilistic containment strategy, Australia and the United States should pursue a more constructive “congagement” with the region. They should not make AUKUS into an anti-China bloc and, more importantly, demonstrate that AUKUS complements ASEAN centrality.
The Australian-US partnership should enhance its economic engagement with Thailand and other ASEAN members. The commercial opportunities offered through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are a vital facet of China’s “charm offensive.” While often criticized as “debt trap diplomacy,” Beijing provides a substantial number of investment schemes to ASEAN countries.
The fundamental question surrounding the recent advancement of the Australia-US alliance is how and in what ways the ASEAN countries, including Thailand, can benefit from this shift amid the region’s evolving power configuration. Ultimately, Thailand desires a constructive security and economic architecture that is disposed to all involved stakeholders and supports ASEAN Centrality.
In conclusion, for success in the broader Indo-Pacific region, the United States and Australia should revise their narrative, refocus on broader security challenges, revitalize economic engagement, and pursue deeper cooperation beyond a narrowly defined geopolitical calculus. Both powers should cultivate a new peaceful and prosperous regional security architecture, one that makes the Australia-US alliance more relevant, not less, to ASEAN and Thailand. This will be a definitive litmus test for this bilateral alliance and ASEAN in the years to come.
About the author
Dr. Jittipat Poonkham is a non-resident Senior Research Fellow, as well as Associate Professor of International Relations at Thammasat University.
